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NEW STANDARDS FOR THE INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL:
"DANGER" REDEFINED
Elizabeth A. McGuan'
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the government's purposes are beneficent."l
- Justice Louis D. Brandeis
INTRODUCTION

Mrs. H., aged seventy-five, had managed her mental illness
successfully for many years. Following the death of her
husband, however, she became increasingly anxious and tearful.
She began to withdraw from the social activities she had
previously enjoyed and to spend more time alone. She lost
weight and began to have trouble sleeping. In the year
following her husband's death, her thinking became disordered;
she began forgetting names, missing appointments, and
misplacing objects. On several occasions, she was convinced she
saw her husband in their home.2 Her adult children noticed the

* J.D. candidate, May 2010, Northern Illinois University College of Law, B.A.,
December 1982, the University of Michigan. Thank you to Professor Lawrence
Schlam, Professor Emeritus Jeffrey Parness, and Legal Writing Instructor Meredith
Stange for their expert advice, attorneys Joseph Monohan for suggesting the topic,
Andy Norman for his insightful comments, and Suzanne Cahalan for updates on
the impact of the amendment on practitioners. Sincere thanks to Teresa Berge of
the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission for both her legal analysis and
her persistent encouragement.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928).
2. See ROBERT N. BUTLER ET AL., AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH: POSITIVE
PSYCHOSOCIAL AND BIOMEDICAL APPROACHES 73 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing
common emotional reactions as expressed in old age).
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changes in her and became concerned that her mental illness
was out of control. They encouraged her to seek medical
attention, but she resisted them because she did not think
anything was wrong. When they tried to get her help against
her will, they were turned away because she did not meet the
standard for involuntary commitment.3 Her family could only
stand by and watch her disease progress, knowing that without
treatment she faced an increased risk of suicide, substance
abuse, homelessness, and criminal victimization. 4
Now, consider a different outcome. Assume Mrs. H.'s
children insist she see her doctor, a general practitioner in her
community.' Because he has not received specialized training in
the diagnosis of mental disorders in the elderly, 6 he
misdiagnoses her normal grieving, early dementia, and
moderate depression as a psychiatric emergency and signs a
petition for her involuntary commitment in a mental hospital.

3. The standard is mentally ill and dangerous to self or others. See O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 565, 575 (1975).
4. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, No Room at the Inn: How the Federal Medicaid
Program Created Inequities in PsychiatricHospital Access for the Indigent Mentally Ill, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 175-76 (2003) (detailing possible outcomes resulting from
severe mental illness); see Steven K. Erickson et al., Beyond Overt Violence:
Wisconsin's Progressive Civil Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental
Health Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 361 (2005) (discussing consequences arising from
untreated mental illness); Rachel A. Scherer, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil
Commitment Statute: A Legal, Medical, and Policy Analysis of Preventative Outpatient
Treatment, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 361, 382-83 (2007) (explaining the reasons the
mentally ill end up in the criminal justice system).
5. "Over half of older persons who receive mental health care receive it from
their primary care physicians." Geriatrics and Mental Health-The Facts, American
Association for Geriatric Psychiatry (2004), http.//www.aapgpa.org/prof/facts-m
hasp (last visited Jan. 3, 2009) [hereinafter AAGP]; see Monique M. Williams,
Invisible, Unequal and Forgotten: Health Disparities in the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 441, 449 (2007).
6. When applied to the elderly, the term "mental disorder" includes both
psychiatric illnesses (such as schizophrenia) and cognitive disorders (such as
dementias). See generally KENNETH SAKAUYE, GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY BASICS 95
(2008) (noting that some depressive disorders cause memory problems severe
enough to appear as cognitive disorders); id. at 95 (explaining that mental illness
and dementias may occur simultaneously); BUTLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 125
(discussing the psychological or behavioral changes that frequently accompany
cognitive disorders in the elderly, including paranoia and aggressive impulses); id.
at 235 (providing the extensive list of physical illness and medications which cause
symptoms of mental disorders in the elderly).
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Her life will change dramatically.7 She will be kept behind a
locked door.8 Her autonomy will be removed: other people will
tell her when to get up, when to shower, when to eat, when to
sleep, and what to wear.' She will be subject to whichever
treatments are currently in vogue with the psychiatric
community and which today consist of electroconvulsive
therapy (ECT)IO and medication with psychotropic drugs that
have serious, long-term side effects." She can be subjected to
seclusion,12 chemical restraints,13 and even mechanical

restraints.14

7. "The vulnerability of the aged to death or illness as a result of changing
their living arrangements ([called 'moving trauma' or] 'transfer mortality') is a
serious cause for concern." BUTLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 313.
8. ELYN R. SAKS, REFUSING CARE 54 (2002).
9. Id.
10. "During the last decade, the 'typical' ECT patient has changed from lowincome males under forty, to middle-income women over sixty-five." Mike E.
Jorgensen, Is Today the Day We Free Electroconvulsive Therapy?, 12 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L.J. 1, 5 n.13 (2008).
11. Katherine Brown & Erin Murphy, Falling Through the Cracks: The Quebec
Mental Health System, 45 MCGILL L.J. 1037, 1062 (2000).
[A] significant disadvantage to the use of such drugs is the side effects
suffered by those who take these medications over a prolonged period ...
[The more serious and enduring side effects are the movement or
neuromuscular disorders] the most prevalent one being tardive dyskinesia.
This disorder ... is generally thought to be untreatable and irreversible. It
may present itself in the form of involuntary movements of the tongue,
mouth or cheeks; similarly it may cause bizarre, involuntary movements of
the torso or limbs . . . While clinical studies on the prevalence of these side
effects .

..

yield various results, the incidence . .. is not insignificant.

Id. at 1062-63; see BUTLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 401 (explaining that "the majority of
elderly patients demonstrate cognitive impairments as a side effect of [ECT].")
12. SAKS, supra note 8, at 122. "Seclusion involves locking someone in a small,
bare room that is devoid of anything that could be used to hurt oneself or others."
Id. The Illinois statute regulating seclusion is codified at 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2109 (2005).
13. SAKS, supra note 8, at 167. "Patients . . . can be given heavy doses of
medication that will restrain them chemically; at the limit, patients can be made to
fall asleep." Id. at 164. Illinois statute permits the use of emergency medications for
serious and imminent physical harm, which are essentially chemical restraints. 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107(a) (2005).

14. SAKS, supra note 8, at 147.
Staff suggest that she needs to be restrained. When Julia resists, six
orderlies converge on her, pin her to the bed, and, despite her struggles,
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Many people prefer jail to a mental hospital because
"prisons have gyms, libraries, long periods of private time, paid
employment, better employability after release, and many other
advantages . . . ."I'

Many people also "prefer the greater

freedom from observation in a jail." 6 And finally, "[tihey may
feel that it is more stigmatizing to be a mental patient than a
criminal."' To be labeled "mentally ill" means to be included in
a group that has been viewed with aversion and fear throughout
history.'8 These attitudes were reflected in laws in place during
the early part of the twentieth century which forbid the mentally
ill to marry and could subject them to compulsory sterilization. 9
When enacting civil commitment statutes, state legislatures
must somehow balance these two competing interests: the
interest of the state in protecting the mentally ill person from the
danger he poses to himself, and the interest of the mentally ill
person in avoiding involuntary confinement.20
While all
cuff her limbs with thick leather straps. Finally, they immobilize her torso
with a body net. Tied spread-eagle to the bed, unable to move, Julia is
now in "six point" restraints. In time Julia's physical pain will increase....
Although she will beg for release . . . Julia will neither be let go, nor told
when staff plan to untie her. Alone, frightened, and in pain, she will begin
to struggle again-a signal to staff that she needs to be restrained longer
.... A significant number [of patients] die in restraints, typically because
they aspirate their vomit and choke to death or have a heart attack. One
study identified 142 deaths reported as occurring during or immediately
after restraint between 1989 and 1999. A research specialist at the Harvard
Center for Risk Analysis estimated many more unreported deaths-50 to
150 each year.
Id. at 146-47; the Illinois statute regarding restraints is codified at 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-108 (2005).
15. SAKS, supra note 8, at 54, 71-72.
16. Id. at 72.
17. Id.
18. See Laura E. Hortas, Asylum Protection for the Mentally Disabled: How the
Evolution of Rights for the Mentally Ill in the United States Created a "Social Group," 20
CONN. J.INT'L L. 155, 159 (2004). In addition to the stigma of being mentally ill, the
elderly mentally ill also face "ageism," which is defined as "prejudice towards,
stereotyping, or discrimination against persons based solely on chronological
age..." Williams, supra note 5, at 443.
19. Hortas, supra note 18, at 159. Thirty states enacted compulsory sterilization
laws. Id. As recently as the 1920s, consistent with Hitler's extreme position of the
eugenics movement, state legislatures in the United States were considering the
idea of killing the mentally ill. Id. at 160.
20. The state's interest in preventing the danger the mentally ill person may
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segments of society are impacted by involuntary commitment
statutes, because the elderly (defined as those over age sixtyfive) suffer mental illness at a higher rate than the general
population, they are impacted by the statutes at a proportionally
higher rate.21 In addition to the fact that they suffer mental
illness at a higher rate, there are simply more elderly now than
there have been at ay time in the past. 22 And finally, the elderly
are the most rapidly growing segment of the population. 23
When the seventy-six million baby boomers turn sixty-five
(between the years 2010 and 2030) the number of elderly will
increase significantly. 24 By the year 2050, it is estimated there
will be eighty-six million elderly; 25 if they experience mental
illness at a standard rate, there will be 17.2 million mentally ill
elderly in the United States. 26
Over the past twenty years, legislatures in a number of
states have amended their involuntary commitment statutes to
pose to others is beyond the scope of this note.
21. AAGP, supra note 5. Nearly 20% of the elderly "experience mental
disorders that are not part of normal aging." Id. Additionally, the highest suicide
rate in America is among those aged sixty-five and older. BUTLER ET AL., supra note
2, at 100. The many factors behind the higher rate of mental illness in the elderly
are beyond the scope of this note.
22. BUTLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 7. Factors behind this trend include improved
medical care and a drop in birthrate. Id. at 6.
23. Williams, supranote 5, at 442.
24. AAGP, supra note 5.
25. Helen Y. Kim, Do I Really Understand? Cultural Concerns in Determining
Diminished Competency, 15 ELDER L.J. 265, 268 (2007). However, the rate of mental
illness in the elderly is expected to increase. "With the overall rise in longevity,
there will be an increasing number of new cases of late-life psychosis as well as an
increasing number of patients who developed psychosis in adolescence or young
adulthood and will be living into old age." Dilip V. Jeste, Strengths and Limitations of
Research on Late-Life Psychoses, in EMERGING ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH AND AGING

72, 75 (Margaret Gatz ed., 1995). Also, "[tihe extent of posttraumatic stress disorder
[(PTSD)] among elderly people . . . is only beginning to be appreciated." It is
possible that Vietnam War veterans will experience PTSD and major depression as
they age. Lon S. Schneider, Efficacy of Clinical Treatment for Mental Disorders Among
Older Persons, in EMERGING ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH AND AGING 19, 20-21

(Margaret Gatz ed., 1995).
26. Providing care for such a large percentage of the population will have a
significant impact on society as a whole. "Mental disorders . . . produce an
economic burden that includes direct treatment costs, loss of productivity,
expenditures for public assistance, family and caregiver burden, and legal costs."
Jeste, supra note 25, at 89-90.
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allow for the more aggressive commitment of the mentally ill.27
This note analyzes a typical statute, an amendment to the Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, approved by the
Illinois General Assembly in September 2007, using it as a
paradigm for similar statutes throughout the United States. 28
This note discusses whether the amendment, which redefined
"dangerous conduct," deprives a mentally ill person of a
fundamental liberty interest guaranteed by the Constitution. It
begins with an overview of mental health law in the United
States since World War II. An analysis of the constitutionality of
the amendment follows, looking specifically at issues of
vagueness, whether the amendment comports with Supreme
Court precedent regarding the requirement of danger, and
whether it uses a medical or legal standard for commitment. It
then analyzes arguments made in favor of the amendment and
discusses whether it is possible to modify the amendment to
bring it in line with Supreme Court precedent. Finally, this note
will look at some of the possible consequences of the
amendment as written.
HISTORY OF MENTAL HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES

In the decades following World War II, psychiatric hospitals
were "over-crowded, filthy, warehouse-like institutions." 29
Conventional treatments for mental illness consisted of isolation,
hydrotherapy, insulin coma therapy, convulsive therapies, and
lobotomies.30 "[Alnyone who was adjudged suffering from a
mental illness could be involuntarily placed in treatment, often
with no more than two physicians signing a certificate." 3 1
Mental health care was based solely on a medical standard: if a

27. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 362-63.
28. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
29. Davoli, supra note 4, at 160.
30. Scherer, supra note 4, at 363-64.
31. Jeffrey Geller & Jonathan A. Stanley, Settling the Doubts about the
Constitutionality of Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ.
CONFINEMENT 127, 129 (2005).
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person was determined to have a mental illness, he had no right
to refuse commitment or treatment. 32
A number of factors contributed to a fundamental change in
the delivery of mental health services in the United States in the
1950s and 1960s.33 The process, which came to be known as
"deinstitutionalization," consisted of "the movement of patients
from state psychiatric hospitals to alternative community[based] facilities."3 4 First among these factors was the discovery
in the 1950s of medications to control mental illness; 3 5
chlorpromazine, the first antipsychotic drug, was marketed in
the United States in 1954.36 Second, sociological studies began to
expose the conditions that existed in the institutions.3 7 Third,
public interest and civil rights lawyers began to challenge some
of the mental health practices in use at the time, including the
standards and procedures for involuntary commitment.3 8 In
cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt, courts compared "civil
commitment to criminal confinement and deemed it
constitutionally defective unless it incorporate[d] due process
protections such as notice to the ... patient of the reasons ... for
confinement, a right to counsel, a right to a jury trial, and
consideration of less restrictive alternatives."39 In its landmark
decision, O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court held "a State
cannot constitutionally confine without more a non-dangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends." 40
Recognizing the liberty interest
32. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 364.
33. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,Homelessness,
and LibertarianTheory, 31 EMoRY L.J. 375, 378 (1982).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 378-79.
36. Id. at 379.
37. Id. at 380.
38. Id. at 385-86.
39. Id. at 386-87 (citing Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated 414 U.S. 473, 477 (1974), modified 379 F. Supp. 1376, 1378 (E.D. Wis.
1974), vacated and remanded 421 U.S. 957, 958 (1975), prior judgment reinstated 413 F.
Supp. 1318, 1329 (E.D. Wis. 1976)).
40. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
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involved, the Court then increased the state's burden of proof
from a "preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and
convincing evidence." 4 1 With these rulings, commitment based
solely on a medical standard came to an end. The Court added
to the state's burden a requirement that the legal standard of
dangerousness be shown as well. 4 2
Finally, "whether ...

economic motives were the primary

impetus for deinstitutionalization, they clearly played a critical
role."43 In 1965, when the federal government enacted the
Grants to States for Medical Assistance Program, known as
Medicaid, which was "designed to improve healthcare for the
poor by providing matching funds for state expenditures," it
excluded psychiatric care provided in state-funded psychiatric
hospitals." This exclusion created a major incentive for states to
reduce the number of institutionalized patients and to close
psychiatric hospitals altogether. 4 5
Regardless of the reasons, state and federal governments
moved from a hospital-based setting to a community-based
setting for the delivery of mental health services. 46 The
governments failed, however, to provide funding to the
community to support the increased population of mentally ill
persons who received care there.47 Because of the limited
availability of medical care in the community, 48 the 1970s and
1980s became periods of "transinstitutionalization," as the
mentally ill moved from hospitals to jails,4 9 or to "open air

41. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
42. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 576.
43. Rhoden, supra note 33, at 382.
44. Davoli, supra note 4, at 163.
45. Id. at 170.
46. Rhoden, supra note 33, at 378.
47. Id. at 392.
48. See SAKS, supra note 8, at 1. "[Iln 1983, in Oxford England-a city of
125,000-there were forty-three group homes for deinstitutionalized patients. In
New Haven, Connecticut-also a city of 125,000-in that same year there was one
halfway house." Id.
49. Rhoden, supra note 33, at 391.
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asylums" - the streets.s0

By the 1980s and 1990s it had become clear that the health
care system in the United States was not meeting the needs of
the mentally ill. A large number of the mentally ill were not
receiving care of any kind.5' Their families could not force them
into treatment against their will because they did not reach the
statutory threshold for involuntary commitment.s2 And finally,
many mentally ill persons were becoming trapped in a cycle that
became known as the "revolving door syndrome," in which they
deteriorated
seriously enough to warrant involuntary
commitment, were hospitalized just long enough to become
stable, and were released back into the community, where
without the resources to maintain their recovery, they began to
deteriorate again.5 3 In response to these concerns, 54 legislatures
across the country began to revise their involuntary commitment
statutes to permit for the more aggressive commitment of the
mentally ill."6
SENATE BILL 234

The Illinois General Assembly was among those state
legislatures that amended its mental health code to lower the
standards for involuntary commitment. 56 Legislative hearings
50. Davoli, supra note 4, at 160.
51. See id. at 159.
52. Scherer, supra note 4, at 367. The standard under the preexisting statute in
Illinois was "reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or
herself or another .. .; or ... unable to provide for his or her basic physical needs so
as to guard ... from serious harm." 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 (2005).
53. Rhoden, supra note 33, at 390-91.
54. A number of highly publicized acts of violence by mentally ill people also
served as an impetus for what led the government to determine the system in play
was not working; however, "contrary to popular belief, many scientific studies have
struggled to find a concrete link between violence and severe mental illness."
Scherer, supra note 4, at 377; see SAKS, supra note 8, at 50 ("Most of the evidence
suggests that, with the exception of certain categories such as psychopathy,
mentally ill people . . . are only modestly more likely than the general public to be
dangerous.")
55. State legislatures also began to pass Involuntary Outpatient Commitment
Statutes as a way to address these issues. Scherer, supra note 4, at 362-63.
56. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 (2005).
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indicate the representatives lowered the standard in order to
address two specific problems.5 7 First, many mentally ill persons
did not seek help voluntarily because they were unaware they
had a disease."
Second, the standards for involuntary
commitment were too high to allow families to get their loved
ones help before they had completely deteriorated. 5 9 Senate Bill
234, which went into effect June 1, 2008, made three changes to
the preexisting statute regulating involuntary commitment. 60
First, Senate Bill 234 added a new category of persons
subject to involuntary admission:
A person with mental illness, who, because of the
nature of his or her illness, is unable to understand his
or her need for treatment and who, if not treated, is
reasonably expected to suffer or continue to suffer
mental deterioration or emotional deterioration, or
both, to the point that the person is reasonably
expected to engage in dangerous conduct. 61
Second, a new section was added, which defined dangerous
conduct as "threatening behavior or conduct that places another
individual in reasonable expectation of being harmed, or a
person's inability to provide, without the assistance of family or
outside help, for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard
himself or herself from serious harm." 62
Finally, the section was deleted that read "a person with
mental illness and who because of his or her illness is reasonably
expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or herself
or another in the near future." 6 It was replaced with the
language "a person with mental illness and who because of his
or her illness is reasonably expected to engage in dangerous

57. State of Ill., Transcription Debate on SB 0234 Amending the Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities Code, 95th General Assembly, 65th Legislative Day,
at 204 (May 31, 2007) [hereinafter Debate].
58. Id.
59. Id. at 209.
60. See Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
61. Act of June 1,2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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conduct."M The new language removed the requirement that the
harm be serious, physical, or expected to occur in the near
future. 65
ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT

EXPLANATION OF DUE PROCESS

With this amendment, the Illinois legislature changed the
standards under which the state was permitted to deprive the
mentally ill of their liberty. 66 In the United States, the
government may infringe on such a fundamental right to the
extent it furthers a compelling state interest. 67 However, when
the government infringes on such an interest, an individual has
the right to challenge the state action under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, which provide that
the government cannot deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. 68 In order for the law to
satisfy the Constitution, then, the court must determine if due
process was satisfied; if the court finds that due process was
satisfied, it upholds the law, if it finds it was not, the law is
struck down. In their determination of whether due process is
satisfied, courts are limited to considering whether the statute
violates some specific constitutional provision; courts are not
permitted to evaluate the merits of the legislature's economic,
social, or political policy choices. 69
There are two components to due process.70 Substantive

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See generally id.
67. Christyne E. Ferris, The Search for Due Process in Civil Commitment Hearings:
How Procedural Realities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61 VAND. L. REV. 959,
965-66 (2008).
68. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
69. State ex rel. Six v. Kan. Lottery, 186 P.3d 183, 188 (Kan. 2008).
70. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545

(3d ed. 2006).
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due process asks whether the government has an adequate
reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property.7'
Procedural due process refers to the procedures the government
must follow before acting, such as requirements for notice and
an opportunity to be heard. 7 2 To determine if a statute satisfies
substantive due process, the court looks first at the liberty
interest involved.7 1 If the interest is minimal, courts use the
"rational basis test."74 To satisfy the test, the statute need only
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose and be
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.7 5 Under a rational basis
test, the statute carries a presumption of constitutionality; 76 the
person challenging the statute has the burden of proof (by a
preponderance of the evidence)n that the statute is
If, however, the challenged legislation
unconstitutional.78
impinges upon a fundamental right,79 the court will examine the
statute under the "strict scrutiny" standard to determine
whether it comports with due process.80 To satisfy this standard,
the statute must be necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest.8 ' Additionally, under strict scrutiny, the burden is
placed on the state to prove that the law is constitutional. 82
Finally, the state has the burden of proving it used the least
restrictive means available for attaining its goal.8 3

71. Id.

72. Id. This note focuses on substantive due process, the component changed by
the amendment.
73. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
74. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
75. Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521, 529 (Ill. 2000).

76. In re Commitment of Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Wis. 2002).
77. Ferris, supra note 67, at 968.
78. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 856.
79. Strict scrutiny is also used when the law makes a distinction based on a
suspect class such as race. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 542.
80. Id. at 541.

81. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 529.
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 542.
83. Id. at 541; see Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[Elven though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved.")
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The Supreme Court has consistently held that an
individual's interest in avoiding involuntary commitment is a
fundamental right.84 In O'Connor, the Court held that "[t]here
can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like involuntary commitment of an individual for any
reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the state cannot
accomplish without due process of law."85 Later, in Addington v.
Texas, the Court held that "civil commitment ..

. constitutes a

significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."8 6 In Vitek v. Jones, the Court recognized that even
transfer from prison to a mental hospital implicates a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of the stigmatizing consequences.87
Due to the fundamental interest at stake, when courts
analyze the constitutionality of the Illinois amendment, which
permits involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, strict
scrutiny is required. The state must prove by clear and
convincing evidence it had an interest sufficient to justify
curtailing such a fundamental right." This level of review, strict
scrutiny, will be used as the standard in the following analysis of
whether the Illinois amendment satisfies due process. 89

84. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 580 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Addingon v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
87. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980); see Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26. The
court held:
[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital ...
can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. Whether we
label this phenomena 'stigma' or choose to call it something else is less
important than that we recognize that it can occur and that it can have a
very significant impact on the individual.
88. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. "We conclude that the individual's liberty
interest . . . is of such weight and gravity, that due process requires the state to
justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the
evidence." Id. at 427.
89. The supreme courts in Wisconsin and Washington did not use this level of
scrutiny. See discussion infra Analysis of the Amendment: Is the Amendment Void
for Vagueness?.
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IS THE AMENDMENT VOID FOR VAGUENESS?

A primary concern regarding the constitutionality of the
Illinois amendment is whether it satisfies that aspect of due
process that requires a law to set forth notice of the conduct
prohibited or required. 0 The statute furnishes such notice by
providing objective standards; these standards also permit
uniform application and enforcement of the law.9 1 "[A] statute is
void for vagueness if it fails to give [such] notice to those
wishing to obey the law.. . ."92 Finally, the "vice of vagueness"
is aggravated when the statute in question, such as the Illinois
amendment, "inhibits the exercise of individual freedoms
affirmatively guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." 93
Statutes that lowered the standard for involuntary commitment
survived challenges on void for vagueness grounds in both
Wisconsin and Washington. 94 The courts interpreting the
statutes reasoned that because the statutes provided adequate
notice, objective criteria, and required an evidential showing by
clear and convincing evidence, they were not void for
vagueness.95 These rulings provide a means by which to analyze
the constitutionality of the Illinois amendment.
One of these states, Wisconsin, added language to allow for
commitment before the danger level required by the prior
statute was met.96 This additional language, known as the "fifth
standard," survived a constitutional challenge on void for

90. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 858.
91. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 576 (1974). There is denial of due process
where "[inherently vague statutory language permits . . . selective law
enforcement." Id. See discussion infra Analysis of the Amendment: Level of Danger
Required.
92. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 858.
93. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
94. See generally WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e (1999-2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.020 (West 2008) (while the statute has been amended since the 1986 ruling,
the substantive portion, on which the court's decision is based, remains the same);
In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 859; In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d. 138, 143 (Wash.
1986).
95. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 859; In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d. at 143.
96. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.
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vagueness grounds in the case of In re Commitment of Dennis H.,
which was before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2002.97 The
court found the statute provided objectively discemable
standards by which commitment decisions could be made,98
reasoning that because the statute provided five objective
criteria, "[iut precisely, though perhaps clumsily, identifie[d]
those to whom it applie[d]." 99 The court held that the definition
of dangerousness provided was not unconstitutionally vague,
reasoning that it was "not so obscure that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its applicability." 0 0
A similar statute in Washington also survived a challenge
on void for vagueness grounds in the case of In re Detention of
Although the new, "gravely disabled" standard
LaBelle.'0
02
survived,1 the Washington Supreme Court identified two
specific areas of concern that could arise in its application. 0 3 The

97. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 858. Based on the testimony of two
psychiatrists, a jury determined the subject was in need of inpatient treatment and
the Milwaukee County Circuit Court ordered him committed for a period of six
months. Id. at 854.
98. See id. at 858.
99. Id.

First, the subject of a commitment petition must be mentally ill. Second,
the person .

.

. must be unable, "because of mental illness" to make "an

informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or
treatment." Third, the person must show a "substantial probability" that
he or she "needs care or treatment to prevent further disability or
deterioration." Fourth, the person must evidence a "substantial probability
that he or she will, if left untreated, lack services necessary for his or her
health or safety." Fifth, the person must evidence a "substantial
probability that he or she will, if left untreated . . . suffer severe mental,
emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of the individual's
ability to function independently in the community or the loss of cognitive
or volitional control over his thoughts or actions."
Id. at 858-59.
100. Id. at 859 (citing In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697, 709 (Wis.
1999)).
101. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 2008).
102. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 144-45.
103. Id. at 144. Four respondents appealed from separate orders involuntarily
committing them for treatment of mental disorders following hearings at which
trial courts found them gravely disabled. Id. at 141.
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first was that under the gravely disabled standard the danger
arose from passive behavior,o'I such as self-neglect or inaction,105
as opposed to active behavior, 0 6 and as such the danger might
be more difficult to identify objectively.107 The court also
recognized that the nature of the inquiry, which necessarily
involved critical judgments concerning a person's ability to
provide for his basic needs,108 was such that there was "a danger
of imposing majoritarian values on a person's chosen lifestyle
which, although not sufficiently harmful to justify commitment,
may be perceived by most of society as eccentric, substandard,
or otherwise offensive." 09
Given these two areas of concern, the court held that "the
State must present recent, tangible evidence of failure or
inability to provide for such essential human needs as food,
clothing, shelter, and medical treatment which presents a high
probability of serious physical harm within the near future."" 0
Additionally, recognizing the danger of erroneously committing
under the new language, the court held that in order to justify
such a massive curtailment of liberty, the "care must be shown
to be essential to the individual's health or safety.""'
So
construed, the court held that the language was not
unconstitutionally vague.112
As compared to the statues in Wisconsin and Washington,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. This language accords with prior Supreme Court's reasoning:

May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens
from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask if
the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are physically
unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity
cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical
liberty.
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
110. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 144.
111. Id. at 146 (emphasis in original).
112. Id. at 144-45.
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in Illinois, the conduct regulated, "mental and emotional
deterioration," is not defined in the amendment and has not yet
been interpreted by case law. 113 Additionally, under a plain
meaning analysis, it does not provide criteria that could be used
as a basis for objective application. 114 In legislative hearings,
Representative Louis Lang described emotional deterioration as
"a subjective term with no definition whatsoever in the Bill." 15
He commented further that:
The due process that is presumed in this particular
legislation is constitutionally vague. [I1n the effort of
making sure .

.

. that everyone gets the treatment they

need we must not resort to unconstitutionally vague
language in a Bill that provides for involuntary
commitment of our citizens. It's a very serious legal
principle and we must not ever cross that line."6
A great deal will depend on the level of scrutiny the courts
in Illinois use when they determine if the language "mental and
emotional deterioration" is void for vagueness. When
interpreting the new standards, the courts in Wisconsin and
Washington both used a rational basis level of review. 17 In
Wisconsin, the court did so because it recognized that it was
dealing with "issues of unusual delicacy, in an area where
professional judgments regarding desirable procedures are
constantly and rapidly changing."1 8 As such, the court reasoned
that "[e]very presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if
at all possible, and wherever doubt exists as to a legislative
enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of

113. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 111. Laws 7839-40.
114. Debate, supra note 57, at 204.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 205. Representative Lang further stated that the language was "far too
vague from either a practical point of view to determine who ought to be
committed or definitely from a legal and constitutional point of view." Id. See
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982) (noting that proceedings that "employ
imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations unusually open to
subjective values" magnify the risk for erroneous deprivations of private interests).
117. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 855; In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 145.
118. Id.
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constitutionality."119
In its determination of the standard of review to apply, the
Washington Supreme Court stated that:
As petitioners point out, where as here a significant
deprivation of liberty is involved, statutes must be
construed strictly.... On the other hand, our primary
objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. . . . In so

doing, the spirit and intent of the law should prevail
over the letter of the law.' 20
The intent of the legislature, as the court recognized later in
the opinion, was "to broaden the scope of the involuntary
commitment standards in order to reach those persons in need
of treatment .

.

. who did not fit within the existing, restrictive,

statutory criteria."' 2 ' In giving deference to the legislative intent,
the Washington Supreme Court also analyzed the statute under
a lower level of review. 122
If courts in Illinois use a rational basis level of review, as
they did in Wisconsin and Washington, the phrase "mental and
emotional deterioration," though undefined, may bear a
sufficiently rational basis to the state interest in preventing selfdanger to satisfy due process. 123 However, if the courts follow
the Supreme Court precedent that classifies the liberty interest as
fundamental, and consequently use strict scrutiny to interpret
the statute, they will likely conclude that the amendment does
not provide sufficient notice of the behavior regulated to permit
objective application, and as such find it void for vagueness.124
119. Id. at 856 (citing State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, 263 (Wis. 1995)).
120. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 145.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. The statute does define "dangerous conduct" which could be used to
provide objective criteria, however, dangerous conduct is the second part of a twopart requirement, and the first part, emotional or mental deterioration, remains
undefined. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
124. A final means by which to analyze whether the language is void for
vagueness is to compare it to the language used in Preventive Outpatient Treatment
(PVOT) statutes, which have also been challenged on void for vagueness grounds.
Scherer, supra note 4, at 387. It can be argued that because involuntary commitment
statutes are more restrictive of an individual's liberty interest than PVOT statutes,
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Not only is there an issue of vagueness because the
behavior the amendment seeks to regulate is undefined and
insusceptible of objective application, 12 5 but the legislature has
made the standard of commitment even less clear by including
the words "unable to understand his need or her need for
treatment."126 In Illinois, there is a presumption that the
mentally ill are competent.127 This presumption applies even to
those who have been involuntarily committed,128 and treatment,
such as the administration of psychotropic medication, can only
be made upon application to a court that the recipient lacks the
capacity to make a reasoned decision.129 So, by allowing forcible
commitment of only those people who are unable to make
treatment decisions, which describes only those who are
functioning at a very low level, the legislature may inadvertently
have done the opposite of what it intended to do. It may in fact
have excluded all but the most critically ill, including those who
could have been committed prior to the amendment.o30
Although the legislative intent was to lower the standard for the
involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,131 it could be argued
that the amendment actually raised the standard instead.

they should provide notice of the behavior regulated that is at least as clear, if not
more clear.
125. See Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
126. Id.
127. Jennifer Gutterman, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to
Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV 2401, 2429 (2000). "[T]he Supreme Court in Mills
v. Rogers found a distinction between the standards governing involuntary
commitment and those applying to incompetency. Thus it is now acknowledged
that many mentally ill individuals retain the capacity to function in a competent
manner and control their treatment regimens." Id. at 2429 (citing Mills v. Rogers,
457 U.S. 291, 303 (1982)).
128. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107.1 (2006).
129. In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Ill. 1994). The mental health code "permits
the trial court to authorize the involuntary administration of psychotropic
medication to a person . . . when the court finds by clear and convincing proof,
following a full hearing, that the recipient . . . is incapable of making the drugtreatment decision on his own behalf." Id.
130. In re Phyllis P., 695 N.E.2d 851, 852 (Ill. 1998). "As the Mental Health Code
explicitly provides, '[n]o recipient of services shall be presumed legally disabled."'
Id. (citing 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2006)).
131. See Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
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Finally, including the language "unable to understand his
or her need for treatment" 132 in a standard for involuntarily
commitment raises some serious ethical issues. One is that the
standard requires a third party to make a number of value
judgments: that a person is ill, that appropriate treatment is
available, that he would benefit from the treatment, and that he
should be forcibly committed to ensure he receives it.133 "Unable
to understand a need for treatment" could appropriately
describe someone who does not agree with a diagnosis or who
prefers to make his own treatment decisions.lm Additionally,
the statutory language is based on current medical theories
about mental illness.' And finally, without implying it was the
legislature's intent, the fact remains that the standard opens the
door for abuse by the government.136 As the Illinois Supreme
Court noted, "in the past, other governments have used
involuntary psychiatric treatment as a 'ruse' and a 'device' to
silence critics." 13 7 Because of the gravity of these issues, it would
be unwise to include the language "unable to understand a need
for treatment," within a standard for involuntary commitment.
LEVEL OF DANGER REQUIRED

A second concern regarding the constitutionality of the
Illinois amendment is whether the danger the state seeks to
prevent is sufficient to justify the deprivation of the liberty
interest involved. 38 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the United States

132. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
133. See id.
134. SAKS, supra note 8, at 96-97. "The typical reasons patients refuse medication
generally do not reflect incompetence and are worthy of respect."
135. See discussion infra pp. 209-11.
136. See In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d at 352.
137. Id. (citing People v. Valentine, 558 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ill. 1990)); see also SAKS,
supra note 8, at 193-94. "[A]llowing denial to be a basis for an incompetency
finding-and thus forced treatment-is in fact fraught with danger ... [Ilt would
also allow us to characterize political dissidents as ill, and then to use their
understandable denial that they are ill as a basis for their involuntary
treatment. . . ." Id.
138. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
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Supreme Court established a two-part standard for involuntary
commitment: a medical standard, that the person be mentally ill,
and a legal standard, that the person be dangerous.139 However,
the Court did not establish the level of danger required to justify
commitment.140 State legislatures have attempted to fill this gap
in their civil commitment statutes.141 While the levels of danger
that must be shown vary from state to state, 4 2 legislators
generally consider three factors: the nature of the harm they seek
to prevent, the immediacy of the danger, and the likelihood of the
danger occurring. 143 As applied, the greatest harm is that which
is severe, imminent, and certain.""
When deciding if the level of danger required by the
Wisconsin statute satisfied due process, the circuit court in In re
Dennis H. concluded the new standard constituted a new
description of dangerousness sufficient to justify commitment; 145
it encompassed a requirement of present dangerousness, "albeit
'in a little different vocabulary.' 146 The court found the statute
constitutionally appropriate because it "did not dispense with
[the requirement of] dangerousness as a pre-condition of
commitment;" 147 it "merely defined it in a different way."148 In
affirming the circuit court's decision,149 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reasoned that:
By permitting intervention before a mentally ill
person's condition becomes critical, the legislature has
enabled the mental health treatment community to
break the cycle associated with incapacity to choose
medication or treatment, restore the person to a
relatively even keel, prevent serious and potentially
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id.
Ferris, supra note 67, at 961.
Id. at 973.
Id. at 966.
Id.
Id.
In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 855.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 855.
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catastrophic harm, and ultimately reduce the amount of
time spent in an institutional setting. This type of
"prophylactic intervention" does not violate substantive
due process.5 0
Because the Wisconsin statute permits commitment in order
to prevent danger, logically it cannot require dangerousness as a
prerequisite to commitment. In order to continue to pass
constitutional muster, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly
changed the definition of dangerousness; 15' it redefined danger
from narrow to broad based on an increased awareness of the
Additionally, the court
pathology of mental illness. 152
recognized a more "flexible interpretation of dangerous," 5 3 no
longer requiring that a mentally ill person be "literally"
dangerous.M Rather than using O'Connor to strike down the
Wisconsin statute, the Wisconsin court "used O'Connor to justify
its ruling while presenting the parens patriae power in the
clothing of dangerousness."15 5 The problem with this reasoning
is that the legal standard set by the United States Supreme Court
requires a showing of dangerous conduct before the state can
commit a mentally ill person against his will.15 6 If a state's intent
is to commit an individual based on behavior that is not
sufficiently dangerous to satisfy due process, it cannot describe
the behavior on which it wants to commit and then label the
behavior "dangerous." 57
When interpreting a statute similar to Wisconsin's fifth

150. Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
151. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 363; see Geller et al., supra note 31, at 135
("[Tihe court's definition of what is dangerous was what most would call 'need for
treatment."')
152. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 363.
153. Geller et al., supra note 31, at 130.
154. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 377.
155. Geller et al., supra note 31, at 136.
156. See O'Connor,422 U.S. at 575.
157. It is an established principle in law that "the mere entitling of a procedure
cannot change its nature or character." State v. Froelich, 146 N.E. 733, 737 (1925); see
generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (discussing "NewSpeak" and the impact on
society of a government that changes the meaning of words in order to
accommodate its political agenda).
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standard, the Washington Supreme Court, in the case of In re
Detention of LaBelle, found that the statute reached the level of
danger required by O'Connor.'" Although the appellants
contended it did not reach the requisite level because it did not
require a showing of imminent danger, the court did not agree,
reasoning that by the time the state files a petition for
involuntary commitment, the individual will already have been
detained in a hospital for a period of time.'59 The care received
will have lessened the imminence of the danger.16 0 As a result,
"[t]he State's continued interest in confining and treating such
individuals would be frustrated by a requirement of 'imminent
danger." 61
Rather than focusing on immediacy as the
determinative factor, the court looked at the type of harm and
the likelihood of it occurring.162 The court required, "a showing
of a substantial risk of danger or serious physical harm resulting
from failure to provide for essential health and safety needs."'63
Given the two factors were satisfied,6 the court concluded that
the danger requirement had been met.16 s
When analyzed according to the factors as defined by
statute in Wisconsin and Washington, the danger required by
Illinois is lower.166 With respect to type of harm, Illinois only
requires that the harm be "serious,"167 while Wisconsin requires
it to be "severe,"168 and Washington requires it to be
"essential." 69
In addition, Illinois has no immediacy

158. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
159. Id. at 143-44.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Id. at 144. "A requirement of imminent danger as a prerequisite to
continued confinement could result in release of mentally ill patients who are still
unable to provide essential health and safety needs."
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40; WIS. STAT. §
51.20(1)(a)2.e (1999-2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 2008).
167. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
168. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e (1999-2000).
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 71.05.020

(West 2008).
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requirement, having removed a former requirement of "in the
near future" and not replaced it.17o Finally, in Illinois, the
likelihood of harm occurring is significantly lower: "reasonably
expected to suffer or continue to suffer mental deterioration or
emotional deterioration, or both, to the point that the person is
reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct,"1 7 1 which
is lower than Wisconsin's "substantially probable"1 7 2 or
Washington's "substantial risk." 73
As it did with the issue of vagueness, the level of scrutiny
the courts use will determine whether the level of danger
described in the Illinois amendment meets the constitutional
standard.17 4 Under a rational basis level of review, it is possible
that the state's interest in avoiding "dangerous conduct," as
defined in the statute, is sufficiently related to the means used to
satisfy due process. 75 Under strict scrutiny, however, the
danger described by the Illinois amendment is not serious
enough to justify the deprivation of a liberty interest of the
magnitude of avoiding involuntary confinement.17 6 To justify
the deprivation, the danger the state is attempting to prevent
must be critical.'"
This conclusion is supported by the holding in O'Connor,in
which the Supreme Court held that the mentally ill person is not
dangerous if he is "capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends." 78 The statute in Wisconsin accords with
Supreme Court precedent because it provides that if care is
available in the community, the substantial probability of harm

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 111. Laws 7839-40.
Id.
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e (1999-2000).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 2008).
See Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 529.
See id.
Id.
Id.
O'Connor,422 U.S at 576.
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does not exist.179 In Illinois, however, dangerous conduct is
defined as a person's inability to provide for basic needs without
the assistance of family or outside help.o80 In other words, if the
individual needs help, he can be committed, even if with that
help he would have survived.'8 1 This is arguably in violation of
Supreme Court precedent and, as such, is violative of due

process rights. 182
In fact, the legislature's description of "dangerous conduct"
in the Mental Health Code is strikingly similar to its definition of
"self-neglect" in the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act. 1 3 "Selfneglect" in the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act is defined as:
[A] condition that is the result of an eligible adult's
inability, due to physical or mental impairments, or
both, or a diminished capacity, to perform essential
self-care tasks that substantially threaten his or her own
health, including: providing essential food, clothing,
shelter, and health care; and obtaining goods and
services necessary to maintain physical health, mental
health, emotional well-being, and general safety.184
When the two statutes are analyzed according to the three
factors used to define danger, "self-neglect" is a significantly
more dangerous behavior than "dangerous conduct." 85 Even
though the type of harm is similar, under the Mental Health
Code, a person can be committed if he is reasonably expected to
suffer mental or emotional deterioration to the point that he is
reasonably expected to engage in dangerous conduct at some

179. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 859. Although the language in the

Washington statute does not address the issue, the Washington Supreme Court did
quote the relevant language from O'Connorin its opinion in In re Det. of LaBelle, 728
P.2d at 143.
180. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40 (emphasis
added).
181. See id.
182. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 576.
183. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT.

20/2 (i-5) (2006); see Debate, supra note 57, at 208

("[T]hat Bill produced a knock at the door by someone who was going to offer
services. This Bill, in contrast with a very similar kind of standard, can lead to
involuntary commitment.")
184. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/2 (i-5) (2006).
185. See id.; Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 111.Laws 7839-40.
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unspecified time in the future.18 6 In contrast, self-neglect has no
immediacy or likelihood requirement because the harm must be

actually occurring.'87
By defining the same behavior as "dangerous" when
applied to the mentally ill and as "self-neglect" when applied to
the elderly, Illinois has created two problems. 8 8 First, it has
done the same thing Wisconsin did: described behavior on
which it intends to commit the mentally ill and then labeled the
behavior dangerous.8 9 If the behavior the legislature defined as
"dangerous" is not truly dangerous, then the behavior does not
meet the legal standard required by the Supreme Court, and the
amendment does not satisfy due process.190 More significantly,
the legislature seems not to have considered the elderly mentally
ill, whose behavior may fall under either the statutory definition
of "dangerous conduct" or "self-neglect."191 If the behavior is
classified as dangerous conduct, the elderly mentally ill person
can be involuntarily committed.192 If it is classified as selfneglect, an agency designated by the Department on Aging of
the State of Illinois will develop a service care plan, which
provides needed services and which "involves the least
restriction of the eligible adults' activities."193 For Illinois to
legislate that the same behavior has different consequences
depending on the code section used permits subjective
application of the law in violation of due process.
ARE BOTH MEDICAL AND LEGAL STANDARDS REQUIRED?

A third concern regarding the constitutionality of the
Illinois amendment is whether it permits involuntary
186. Act of June 1,2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
187. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/2 (i-5) (2006).
188. See id.; Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
189. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 380.
190. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
191. 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/2 (i-5) (2006); Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602,
2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
192. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 111.Laws 7839-40.
193. 2006 Ill. Legis Serv. P.A. 94-1064 (H.B. 4976); 320 ILL COMP. STAT. 20/5 (a).
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commitment on a finding of mental illness alone. 194 It is well
established in the law that a showing of both mental illness and
dangerous conduct is required to satisfy substantive due process
before involuntary commitment.195 A finding of mental illness
alone cannot justify commitment.'96 As such, when enacting
statues allowing involuntary commitment of the mentally ill,
legislatures need to craft laws that do not commit those who are
not a danger to themselves.'97
When analyzing the "gravely disabled" standard, the
Washington Supreme Court noted that the possibility existed
that persons could be committed solely because they were
suffering from a mental illness. 198 The court cautioned that
"[i]nvoluntary commitment on this basis alone is not supported
by a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify such a
significant deprivation of liberty."1 99 While Washington's statute
passed muster, 200 the court cautioned that because the statute
"incorporate[d] medical technology, a decision to commit under
this standard may involve more a medical decision than a legal
one. Consequently, there is a danger that excessive judicial
deference will be given to the opinions of mental health
professionals, thereby effectively insulating their commitment
recommendations from judicial review." 20 1 Because of this
possibility, the court held it was particularly important to
require evidence to provide a "factual basis for concluding that
an individual 'manifests severe [mental] deterioration.' To

194. See O'Connor, 422 U.S at 575.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. People v. Lang, 498 N.E.2d.1105, 1126 (Ill. 1986).
198. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see generally Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of
Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV 147 (2006) (discussing Roe v. Wade and the
interplay between law and medicine). "The Court in essence delegated juridical
authority to physicians. Regulation was replaced by diagnosis, which was itself
regulation." Id. at 194. "Roe's invalidation of all extant abortion laws delegated
responsibility to another center of power." Id. at 196 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973)).
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justify commitment, care must be shown to be essential to an
individual's health or safety." 202 The court held that it was not
sufficient that the care required was "preferred, beneficial, or
even [in the patient's] best interests." 203 Because the Washington
statute met these standards,2 04 the court found it was
constitutionally based on a showing of both danger and mental
illness and not mental illness alone. 205
The Wisconsin Supreme Court analyzed the same issue in
In re Dennis H.,206 in which the plaintiff argued that the fifth
standard's definition of dangerousness was "essentially no more
than a reiteration of the definition of mental illness . . . and

therefore allowe[d] involuntary commitment upon a finding of
mental illness alone."2 07 The court found, however, that the fifth
standard still required dangerousness:
The fifth standard's focus is on dangerous to selfdangerousness of a particularly insidious nature
because it is chronic and cyclical (measured by
treatment history and recent acts or omissions), and
brought on by mental illness that produces an
incapacity to make medication or treatment decisions

202. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
203. Id. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in O'Connor that
the State may not confine for the purpose of "raising the living standards of those
capable of surviving safely in freedom." O'Connor,422 U.S. at 576.
204. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
205. Id.
206. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 858.
207. Id. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson articulated
concern regarding the constitutionality of the new standard:
Both mental illness and dangerousness are necessary to satisfy the
requirements of substantive due process for involuntary civil commitment.
A court must balance the desires of mental health professionals, friends,
and family members who believe that care and treatment is in the best
interests of a person who is mentally ill, and the constitutional liberty
interests of individuals to be free from unwanted and unnecessary
restraints. ... This balance has been struck by requiring proof of mental
illness and imminent dangerousness

to self . . . before permitting

involuntary civil commitment. The fifth standard comes perilously close to
upsetting this balance. It passes constitutional muster .. . only so long as
courts require significant evidence of the statutory elements and treatment
is in fact provided.
Id. at 864-65 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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as well as a substantial probability of incapacity to care
for oneself. The fifth standard does not apply to
mentally ill people who are not dangerous to
themselves. 208
While the court found the statute met the requirement of
distinguishing between those mentally ill who are dangerous
and those who are not,2 09 it essentially held that the incapacity to
make treatment decisions amounts to dangerousness. 210 The
court does not require factual evidence of dangerous conduct
caused by the incapacity, 211 or even evidence of deterioration
caused by the incapacity which might lead to dangerous
conduct, 212 but is satisfied by a showing of the incapacity itself. 21 3
In so holding, the court relies on an assumption held by some in
the mental health field: that the incapacity to make treatment
decisions is inherently dangerous. 214 If the assumption is correct,
then the court's reasoning is valid. 215 If the assumption is not
correct, however, and such incapacity is not inherently
dangerous, but rather the symptom or manifestation of a
disease, then the court has permitted commitment on the basis
of mental illness alone. 216
Under this analysis, "the
dangerousness requirement is eviscerated and mental illness
becomes the sole criteria for civil commitment."21 7
As applied to the amendment in Illinois, the reasoning the
courts use will determine if the legislature distinguished
between those mentally ill who are dangerous and those who

208. Id. at 860.
209. Id. at 862.
210. The court supports this conclusion by stating that mentally ill persons who
lack the capacity to make informed decisions are "clearly dangerous because their
incapacity to make treatment decisions makes them more vulnerable to severely
harmful deterioration." Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 381.
215. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 862.
216. See id.
217. Ferris, supra note 67, at 974.
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are not. 218 If they follow the reasoning used by the court in
Washington, which was to require evidence to provide for a
factual basis,219 it is possible the Illinois statute is constitutional
under a rational basis level of review, even though the level of
care required in Illinois is lower. 220 However, courts in Illinois
may follow the Wisconsin court's reasoning, that given the
nature of this particular disease, in which a symptom of the
disease, the inability to understand treatment decisions, is
inherently dangerous.221 In that case, then the question then
becomes whether the assumption the Wisconsin court based its
decision on is sound. 222 This is a crucial determination, because
if the inability to make treatment decisions is a symptom of a
disease and not inherently dangerous conduct, then even under
is
the amendment
the lower standard of review
unconstitutional.
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE AMENDMENT

Two main arguments support the constitutionality of the Illinois
amendment. 223 Both arguments are based on current medical
understanding of mental illness. 224 The first is that mental illness
produces incapacity to make treatment decisions. 225 The second
is based on the first: because of the nature of mental illness, the
danger requirement has been satisfied by a showing of mental
illness alone.26
Supporters of these arguments feel this basis is justified
because of the tremendous advances in the understanding of
mental disorders that science has made over the past twenty

218. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 862; In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
219. In re Det. of LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 146.
220. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.020 (West 2008).
221. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 862.
222. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 381.
223. See In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 861, 863.
224. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 381.
225. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 861.
226. Id. at 863.
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years .27 As a result of these advances, researchers now have a
better understanding of how mental illnesses affect brain
morphology and functioning. 228 In particular, there has been an
increased awareness that many people with severe mental
illness do not believe they are sick. 229 This condition, termed
anosognosia, 2 30 prevents the mentally ill effected from
voluntarily seeking treatment. 231 Research has also shown that
this lack of insight is often correlated with decreased cognitive
abilities. 232 Consequently, it is argued that many mentally ill
persons have such impaired insight into their illnesses 3 that
they have lost the ability to make rational choices. 234 Current
research has shown that these behaviors are not really choices,
but rather symptoms of a disease. 235 As such, legislatures, such
as Illinois', have recognized that "a benevolent and lucid mental
health policy should have as its underpinnings an
understanding of the pathogenesis of mental illness and should
conform its principles to enhancing individual liberties by
providing treatment, even over a person's objections, when there
is compelling evidence that such treatment will uphold these

goals." 2 36
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT

Although it could be argued that given the unique nature of the
disease, a diagnosis of mental illness is sufficient to satisfy both
the medical and legal standards for involuntary commitment,

227. Scherer, supra note 4, at 382.
228. Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 381.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 385.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see Geller et al., supra note 31, at 138 ("Perhaps it is time to recognize
that the abrogation of the opportunity for treatment is a much greater impediment
to autonomy and self determination than is the denial of treatment in the name of
sustaining the faux liberty of a psychotic state.")
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there are two serious problems with this reasoning. The first is
that current medical understanding is a theory, not a legal
principle, and as such cannot be used to satisfy a legal standard
on its own. 23 7 In O'Connor, the Supreme Court recognized the
uncertainty of diagnosis in the field of psychiatry and the
tentativeness of professional judgment. 238
The Court
pronounced that "few things would be more fraught with peril
than to irrevocably condition a State's power to protect the
mentally ill upon the providing of 'such treatment as will give
[them] a realistic opportunity to be cured." 239 Although the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the uncertainty endemic
to psychiatry as expressed in O'Connor,240 it used it as a
justification for deferring to the legislature. 24 1 In so ruling, the
court placed too much emphasis on the uncertainty of
psychiatry and insufficient emphasis on the legal principal
involved: the state's power to confine its citizens. 242
One aspect underlying this uncertainty is that psychiatry,
like all areas of medicine, continues to change. 243 As the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized:
Diagnostic classifications in the mental-health field are
constantly undergoing revision, and thus it would be
unwise to equate the legal term "mentally ill" in section
1-119 with the laundry list of diagnoses or psychiatric
classifications in vogue at a given moment. Otherwise,
the definition of "mental illness" could ebb and flow
depending on the then-current consensus of mental-

health professionals. 244
Consider that lobotomies were the conventional treatment
for mental illness in the 1940s and 1950s 24 5-in fact, the physician
237. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 584.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 588-89.
240. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 856.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. People v. Lang, 498 N.E.2d at 1125.
244. Id.
245. Sarah Linsley Starks & Joel T. Braslow, The Making of ContemporaryAmerican
Psychiatry Part I: Patients,Treatments, and Therapeutic Rationales Before and After World

2009]1

DANGER REDEFINED

213

who perfected the procedure won the Nobel Prize in 1949.246
Additionally, homosexuality was classified as a mental illness in
the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders until the 1974 edition. 2 47 We cannot
conceive of the state committing a homosexual today because he
does not recognize his need for treatment.2 48
An additional reason for this uncertainty is that even within
the same time period experts in the field of mental illness
disagree. 249 The Court in Ake v. Oklahoma held "psychiatry is not
. . . an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and
frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate
diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on
cure and treatment, and
on likelihood
of future
25 0
dangerousness."
While some professionals today believe
forced treatment has therapeutic value, the American
Psychology Association files amicus briefs supporting the right
of competent psychiatric patients to refuse treatment.25 1 If the
premise of the American Psychological Association is correct,
forced treatment would be counterproductive to recovery. 252

War II, 8 HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 176, 184 (2005).
246. Id. "Although virtually abandoned over 40 years ago, the lobotomy was
considered the most 'scientific of psychiatric interventions' at the time and Egas
Moniz, who directed the first modern lobotomy, was awarded the Nobel Prize in
Physiology and Medicine in 1949." Id. at 184.
247. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 347 n.20

(1994). "[T]he view of homosexuality as a disease was still widely held in the
medical community throughout the 1960s." Id. at 53.
248. Scherer, supra note 4, at 364 n.11. "Permitting civil commitment on a strict
medical model alone could erode rights of individuals due to medical error or
inaccurate scientific theories." Id.; see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 813-14
(discussing the eugenic sterilization of Carrie Buck, whom the Court described as
"feeble minded," but who was later discovered to be of normal intelligence (citing
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927))).
249. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985).
250. Id.
251. SAKS, supra note 8, at 18; see BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT 333-37 (American Psychological Association 1997) ("[T]he

potential for successful treatment in many contexts would appear to increase when
individuals choose treatment voluntarily rather than through coercion . .. Indeed,
such coercion may backfire, producing a negative 'psychological reactance' that sets
up oppositional behavior leading to failure.")
252. See WINICK, supra note 251, at 337.
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The second problem with the reasoning used by supporters
of the amendment is that courts may not evaluate the merits of a
legislature's policy choices;253 they are limited to considering
whether the statute violates a constitutional provision.2 54 As the
Supreme Court made clear in O'Connor, "[in light of the wide
divergence of medical opinion regarding diagnosis of and
proper therapy for mental abnormalities, '[courts] . . . must
instead concern themselves with the validity under the
Constitution of the methods which the legislature has
selected.' 255 Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that
"courts generally proceed with restraint in this complex,
delicate, policy-sensitive area, deferring to the procedural
scheme the legislature has chosen," 256 the issue is not whether
there are different courses of action the legislature could take
based on conflicting theories and policies regarding mental
illness. The issue is whether, given the liberty interest involved,
the method the legislature has chosen satisfies due process.
The question, then, is whether courts in Illinois will permit
the legislature's method of using a current medical
understanding to satisfy a legal standard or whether they will
follow Supreme Court precedent requiring both a medical and
legal standard and declare the amendment unconstitutional. 25 7
The language of the Illinois amendment tracks virtually word
for word with current medical understanding: "a person with
mental illness who, because of the nature of his or her illness, is
unable to understand his need for treatment." 258 Additionally,
representatives indicated that their intent was to allow families
to get help for their mentally ill relatives who, because of their
disease, did not understand their need for treatment. 259

253. See Kan. Lottery, 186 P.3d at 188.
254. Id.
255. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 587. "Judges are not free to read their private notions
of public policy or public health into the Constitution." Id. at 586.
256. In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 856.
257. See O'Connor 422 U.S. at 575; In re Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d at 851.
258. Act of June 1, 2008, Pub. Act 95-602, 2007 Ill. Laws 7839-40.
259. Debate, supra note 57, at 209. Representative Kathleen Ryg stated that it
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However, Supreme Court precedent does not permit the
legislature to set a legal standard on something as uncertain as a
psychiatric theory and does not permit courts to evaluate policy
choices made by legislatures. 260 The reasoning the Supreme
Court used in District of Columbia v. Heller applies to the
amendment at hand: "[t]he Constitution leaves the District of
Columbia a variety of tools for combating [the problem of
mental illness], . . . but .

.

. constitutional rights necessarily take

certain policy choices off the table." 261
WAYS TO MODIFY THE AMENDMENT

Given Supreme Court precedent and due process requirements,
at a minimum, the legislature should remove the language
defining as dangerous a person who could survive with help
from the community. 262 But it could be argued that there is no
way to bring the amendment in line with the Constitution,
because of what the state is attempting to do, i.e., commit an
individual based on his status before there is a factual showing
of dangerous conduct, is an inherent violation of due process. 263

was the legislature's responsibility to look out for mentally ill individuals who "by
of the nature of their illnesses, [were] not able to look out for their best interests." Id.
260. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 587-88.
261. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008). "We are aware of
the problem of handgun violence. . . . The Constitution leaves the District of
Columbia a variety of tools for combating that problem, including some measures
regulating handguns. But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily
takes certain policy choices off the table." Id.
262. O'Connor,442 U.S. at 576.
263. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). In Robinson v. California,the
Supreme Court struck down a statute which made the "status" of narcotic addiction
a criminal offense. Id. at 666. Even though, as an addict, the defendant was likely to
use drugs, which is a crime, he could not be convicted based on his status as an
addict before he actually committed a crime. The Court reasoned that a state law
that imprisoned a person as a criminal even though "he has never touched a drug
or been guilty of irregular behavior inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at
667. It recognized that "even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. As such, it could be
argued that a person cannot be committed for having a mental illness. Even though,
as a person with a mental illness, he is likely to manifest symptoms of his disease,
he cannot be confined based on his status as a person with an illness before he
actually becomes dangerous.
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The amendment would possibly survive a constitutional
challenge under a rational basis level of review. 26 4 Under such a
low level of scrutiny, the state's interest in preventing
"dangerous conduct" as defined in the amendment could
possibly justify the deprivation of liberty involved, 265 and if the
court relies on current medical understanding, a showing of
mental illness would likely meet both the medical and legal
standards required for commitment. 266 Additionally, under a
rational basis level of review the state only needs to show that
the means are a reasonable, not a necessary, way to accomplish
the objective.2 6 7
However, given the liberty interest at stake, the correct
standard of review is strict scrutiny, and under strict scrutiny
the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that its
interest in regulating the behavior justifies the deprivation of the
liberty interest involved. 268 Under strict scrutiny the state must
have a compelling interest in controlling the conduct: the danger
must be serious, imminent, and certain. 269 Additionally, while a
showing of mental illness satisfies the medical standard, 270 the
legal standard must still be satisfied by factual evidence of
dangerous conduct. 27 1 Finally, strict scrutiny requires proof that
the law is the least restrictive alternative means for
accomplishing the state's goals. 27 2 Short of taking a person's life,
involuntary confinement is the most restrictive means available
to the state for any purpose; certainly there are less restrictive
means for controlling "mental or emotional deterioration." 273

264.
265.
266.
267.
n.4.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 529.
Id.
Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 381.
Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 470; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152
See Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 529.
Id.
Erickson et al., supra note 4, at 364.
O'Connor,422 U.S. at 563.
Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 470.
In re Nancy A., 801 N.E.2d 565, 580 (111.App. Ct., 2003).
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In the final analysis, even if it were possible to bring the
amendment in line with the Constitution, it still would not
address the real reason the mental health system is failing in
Illinois: a lack of funding. 274 A major assumption made with
respect to involuntary commitment is that the mentally ill reject
treatment, when, in fact, they cannot afford it.275 For the
majority of the severely mentally ill, "private insurance is
essentially meaningless.
Because of their illness, most are
indigent, and private insurance is a luxury they cannot afford
and are not in a position to obtain through employment." 2 76 Of
particular significance for the elderly mentally ill, Medicare does
not pay for prescription pharmaceuticals, such as those used to
control mental illness, and additionally lacks parity between
coverage for health and mental health coverage. 27 And despite
the promises made under the Mental Health Code that no
admission may be limited on the patient's financial status or
ability/inability to pay, 2 78 the fact remains that the number of
beds for psychiatric patients has been drastically reduced. 279 In

After a court determines that a person is subject to involuntary
commitment, the court must order the respondent's placement in the least
restrictive treatment available. The court has several options at its
disposal: ordering hospitalization, ordering outpatient treatment, or
ordering the person to be placed in the care of a relative. . . . There is a
statutory preference for treatment other than hospitalization. Thus,
hospitalization may be ordered if the state proves it is the least restrictive
treatment available.
Id.
274. Helen Gunnarsson, Bill Would Make Involuntary Commitment Easier, 95 ILL.
B.J. 401, 401 (2007); see Gutterman, supra note 127, at 2434 (discussing involuntary
commitment statutes which have been criticized as "'harsh, quick, fixe[s] that [d]o
little to address the system's underlying problems' of inadequate funding and
services for the mentally ill.")
275. Gunnarsson, supra note 274, at 399.
276. Davoli, supra note 4, at 162 n.16 (citing D.J. Jaffe & Mary T. Zdanowicz,
FederalNeglect of the Mentally Ill, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1999, at A31).
277. Anita L. Rosen et al., Mental Health Policy and Older Americans: Historicaland
Current Perspectives, in EMERGING ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH AND AGING 1, 9

(Margaret Gatz, ed. 1995). "The lifetime coverage limit on inpatient care in mental
hospitals is 190 days: no similar limit exists for inpatient care in general
hospitals. . .. " Id.
278. 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-109 (2006).

279. Gunnarsson, supra note 274, at 401.
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Illinois, "[t]here are 1,400 beds for psychiatric patients in state
psychiatric hospitals now, compared with 55,000 beds fifty years
ago, and fewer than 4,000 private hospital beds. Yet the state's
population has doubled in that time."280 As a result, "[p]eople
who are seriously mentally ill and who cannot afford to pay for
care out of their own resources are routinely turned away."2 81
Additionally, the statutory promise does not extend to follow up
care in the community after release from an institution. 282
Increasing restraints on people with mental illness will not
improve the mental health system in Illinois; providing funding
to ensure their access to long-term, intensive community care
will. 28 3
POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AMENDMENT AS WRITTEN

One possible and unintended result of the Illinois amendment is
its impact on the requirements of other laws. 2
Given the
statutory definition of an emergency provided by the
Examination and Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions
and Women in Labor Act (EMTALA), 28 5 an indigent person who
was experiencing mental and or emotional deterioration and
voluntarily sought admission to a hospital would be turned
away;286 then under the same standard he could be forcibly
committed by a court. 287 How dangerously ill could a person be

280. Id.
281. Id. at 399.
282. See generally 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. (2006).
283. See National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Grading the States 2006,
http://www.nami.org/gtstemplate.cfm?section=grading-the-states&template=/tagg
edpage/taggedpagedisplay.cfm&TPLID=63&contented=30964 (last visited Jan. 3,
2009). Despite having the 11th highest per capita income in the nation, Illinois ranks
34th lowest for spending on mental health. Id.
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (2000).
285. See id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
The term 'emergency medical condition' means-a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity such that the
absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to
result in placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy, or
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if he is denied care under a federal law enacted to provide
emergency care? Ill enough to justify confining him against his
will?
Further, by lowering the requirement for involuntary
commitment to less than what the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) requires for disclosure
of a patient's medical records without his consent, it is possible
that Illinois has created a situation in which a person could be
involuntarily committed, but his prior medical records could not
be released to the institution in which he was confined.2 11
Would that not impede the efforts of the medical personnel in
their care of him? The amendment has also created a conflict
with Illinois law regarding the disclosure of mental health
information; will the legislature lower the standards for
disclosure to accommodate the law and consequently erode the
patient's privacy protections? 289
Additionally, even patients who are involuntarily
committed are presumed to have the capacity to make treatment
decisions in Illinois.290 Has the legislature created a situation in
which a person could be admitted under the new, lower
standard, but then because he is not incompetent and does not
meet the standard for forced treatment, not be treated? Does
that not frustrate the purpose behind lowering the standard for
involuntary commitment?
If so, will the legislature attempt to lower the standard for
forced medication as well? What about for ECT? Since the
standards for involuntarily treating patients are similar to the
standards for involuntarily treating prisoners 291 and those found
not guilty by reason of insanity,292 lowering the standards for the

serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious dysfunction of any
bodily organ or part.
Id.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2007).
See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.110/9.2 (2006).
See In re C.E., 641 N.E.2d at 351.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 210 (1990).
Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354, 357 (1983).
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mentally ill could affect a significantly larger class than was
originally intended. In establishing this lowered standard, the
legislature seems to have failed to consider the impact such a
standard would have not just on the mentally ill, but also on
those charged with providing them care.
An additional consequence may be that in order to meet the
increased demands on the system, the state will reduce
procedural safeguards. 29 3 Amendments passed in 2000 reduced
the time a patient could be hospitalized before learning whether
he could be forced to receive treatment. 294 This decrease was
made in response to limits on the number of days for which
insurers would reimburse facilities for inpatient treatment. 29 5
Might further reductions in spending cause further reductions in
procedural safeguards? 296 A reduction in procedural safeguards
is contrary to the reasoning the Supreme Court used in Vitek v.
Jones, "[iut is precisely 'the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric
diagnosis' that justify the requirement of adversary hearings." 297
Finally, Illinois had a comparatively low standard for
involuntary commitment already, 298 but knowing there was no
money to pay for a hospital stay,299 judges in practice used a
higher one. 0 As such, lowering the standard may have no
effect at all.30 Representative Kathleen Ryg acknowledged at
legislative hearings that there was no funding to support the

293. See Anthony E. Rothert, Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Drugs in
Illinois: Balancing Safety and Civil Liberties, 91 ILL. B.J. 496, 501 (2003).
294. Rothert, supra note 293, at 501 (citing 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-107.1(a-5)(2)
(2006)). Additionally, an amendment to the Mental Health Code in 2003 eliminated
the opportunity for a respondent to request a jury trial in forcible treatment cases.
Laws 3644-47).
Id. (citing Act of August 21, 2003, Pub. Act 93-0573, 2003 111.
295. Id.

296. Id. at 498. Procedural safeguards are "important in assuring that the initial
euphoria over the newest mental health treatments does not cause patients to ...
become data for later studies that will reveal the treatments to have less benefit and
cause more harm than originally thought." Id. at 498.
297. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495 (citing Addington, 491 U.S. at 430).
298. Gunnarsson, supra note 274, at 401.
299. Id.
300. Id. Judges used the standard "imminent danger." Id.
301. Id.
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amendment,3 0 2 stating "one of the positions in opposition to this
Bill states that the current standard for involuntary commitment
does not ensure that people who meet the standard are actually
committed, because state and private hospital beds have been so
drastically reduced that it is not a viable treatment option ...
[but] that is not a reason to be against this legislation."3 3 If the
state could not afford the standard for involuntary commitment
already in place, how is it going to afford one that puts more
demands on the system?
CONCLUSION
In 1975, the Supreme Court established a two-part requirement
for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill.30 4 Both parts
are essential.305 Recognizing the deprivation of liberty involved
in involuntary confinement, the Supreme Court required a legal
standard: a person cannot be confined unless he is dangerous.3 06
The legal standard is based on foundational principles that do
not change. 307 But a legal standard alone does not address the
specific issues relating to mental health. Recognizing that
mental illness is a disease, the Supreme Court also required a
medical standard, to reflect the fact that science and medicine
are constantly changing.308
Advances in medical science often prove prior theories
wrong. 309 But citizens of the United States are free to take
advantage of the latest advances, because they can be confident

302. Debate, supra note 57, at 209.
303. Id.
304. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
305. Id. at 576
306. Id.
307. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576 ("In short, a State cannot constitutionally
confine ... a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom.. . ") (referring to Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process
protections).
308. O'Connor,422 U.S. at 584.
309. See Sarah Linsley Starks & Joel T. Braslow, The Making of Contemporary
American Psychiatry Part I: Patients, Treatments, and Therapeutic Rationales Before and
After World War II, 8 HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 176, 184 (2005).
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that the legal standard protects them from actions by the state,
based on any discredited theories, which would have violated
their fundamental rights. If it turns out that the symptoms that
accompany mental illness are not inherently dangerous, there
will be no factual evidence of danger, and the legal standard will
prevent the state from committing in violation of due process. If
the behavior that accompanies mental illness is truly dangerous,
however, there will be evidence of the danger, and the legal
standard will be satisfied. In that case, symptoms can remain
symptoms, and danger does not have to be "redefined."

